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INTRODUCTION
Fifty-two years after the landmark decision Loving v. Virginia,
which struck down anti-miscegenation laws as unconstitutional under
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the Fourteenth Amendment,1 Virginia’s marriage license statute
was once again challenged in federal court.2 In 2019, Virginia still
statutorily mandated individuals to disclose their race in order to
obtain a marriage license.3 When Ashley Ramkishun and Samuel
Sarfo applied for a marriage license in Arlington, Virginia, a court
clerk told them to select “other” if they did not wish to identify their
races.4 Ramkishun, who is of Asian Indian and Guyanese descent,
objected and explained:
When I have to put down my race, most of the time I’m kind of
forced to stick myself in a box I don’t necessarily fit in. . . . I’m not
Asian, I’m not American Indian, I’m not black, I’m not white . . . .
We don’t want to put “other” because we are not “other.” We are
human beings.5
Three couples, including Ramkishun and Sarfo, who intended to
marry in the state but refused to disclose their race to the government,
argued that the statute was a vestige of the Jim Crow era and chal-
lenged the statute on First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds.6 In October 2019, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia held that Virginia’s marriage license law,
which required individuals to state their race on a marriage license
application, was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment,
as it burdened citizens’ fundamental right to marry.7 Acknowledging
the statute’s connection with the Racial Integrity Act of 1924,8 the
1. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
2. Rogers v. Virginia State Registrar, No. 1:19-cv-01149, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Va. filed
Oct. 11, 2019).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-267(A) (2005) (amended 2020).
4. Rachel Weiner, ‘Aryan’ and ‘Octoroon’: Couples challenge racial labels to get






6. Complaint at 1–3, Rogers v. Virginia State Registrar, No. 1:19-cv-01149 (E.D. Va.
filed Sept. 5, 2019) [hereinafter Rogers Compl.]; see Weiner, supra note 4.
7. Rogers, slip op. at 18.
8. See PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE
MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA 140–42 (2009). The Racial Integrity Act of 1924 was Virginia’s
miscegenation law which instituted a one-drop rule to preserve white purity. See id.; see
also infra Section I.A notes 28–30 and accompanying text (addressing anti-miscegenation
laws and the path to Loving v. Virginia). Walter Plecker, Virginia’s first Registrar of Vital
Statistics, fiercely advocated for the Act, as he was “obsess[ed] with drawing racial lines
around sex and marriage [and linking] the politics of white purity to the rising scientific
authority of eugenics.” PASCOE, supra note 8, at 140. Plecker’s office “instructed marriage
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court explained, “[t]he Commonwealth of Virginia is naturally rich
in its greatest traditions. But like other institutions, the stain of
past mistakes, misgivings and discredited legislative mandates
must always survive the scrutiny of our nation’s most important
institution. . . The Constitution of the United States of America.”9
Virginia was not alone in requiring the collection of racial data
on marriage licenses; six other states and territories continue to
mandate that applicants provide this information to the state in
order to obtain a marriage license.10 These racial mandates, much
like Virginia’s law, are vestiges of the Jim Crow era.11
But the collection of private, personal information does not stop
there.12 Six years after Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that same-
sex marriage bans were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
license clerks to take full advantage of these powers and to make ‘every effort to prevent
the marriage of white persons with those of colored origin.’” Id. at 145. The Racial In-
tegrity Act of 1924 became the central law at issue in Loving v. Virginia, and the Supreme
Court struck it down in its 1967 landmark decision. See id. at 150.
9. Rogers, slip op. at 18. On February 25, 2020, the Virginia General Assembly unani-
mously passed S.B. 62 to strike the race requirement from the state’s marriage license
statute. See S.B. 62, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020). The amended statute
went into effect July 1, 2020. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-267 (2020).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-267(A) (2005) (amended 2020); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1165(3) (2000); CONN.GEN.STAT. § 46b-25 (2012); DEL.CODEANN. tit. 13, § 122(a) (2013);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:41(III) (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:224(A)(2) (2016); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 402.100(1)(b) (West 2017). Alabama recently removed this mandate from
its statute, effective August 29, 2019. ALA. CODE § 30-1-9.1(a), (b) (2019). State legislators
in Delaware and New Hampshire introduced bills in December 2019 and January 2020,
respectively, to amend their states’ statutes to remove the race requirement. See H.B.
1644, 166th Gen. Court, 2020 Sess. (N.H. 2020); S.B. 194, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Del. 2019). As of March 2020, the New Hampshire bill has been tabled; however, the
Delaware bill unanimously passed on June 29, 2020, and is awaiting the governor’s
signature. See New Hampshire House Bill 1644 (Adjourned Sine Die), LEGISCAN, https://
legiscan.com/NH/bill/HB1644/2020 [https://perma.cc/TS58-6DNU]; Senate Bill 194, DEL.
GEN.ASSEMBLY, https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?legislationId=47908 [https://perma
.cc/8KQH-3CYD]. Minnesota collects this information, but in 1969, the state Attorney
General filed an official opinion stating that the state cannot deny a license to an individual
who refuses to state their race, as it is not related to the regulatory purpose of the license.
Minnesota Application for Marriage License, https://www.co.nobles.mn.us/wp-content/up
loads/2016/12/Marriage-License-Application_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/5PER-VQBR]; 2 Op.
Att’y Gen. 300-m (1969). North Carolina gives applicants the option to fill out their race,
and they may select from twenty-four racial options pre-approved by the state, including
“other.” See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-16 (2020).
11. See PASCOE, supra note 8, at 9 (“As miscegenation laws began to take hold,
marriage license applicants were required to state (and clerks to record or approve) their
‘race or color.’ During the twentieth century, marriage licensing was the most common,
and surely the most effective, means of preventing interracial marriage and enforcing
miscegenation laws. And it was a procedure that survived long after miscegenation laws
themselves were repealed.”).
12. See 750 ILL.COMP.STAT.ANN. 5/202(a) (West 1977); DEL.CODEANN. tit. 13, § 122(a)
(2013); MINN.STAT.§ 517.08(1a) (2016); KY.REV.STAT.ANN. § 402.100(1)(b) (West 2017);
OR. REV. STAT. § 106.041(2)(b) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-105(1)(a) (West 2019).
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Amendment,13 five states still mandate parties to disclose their sex
on a marriage license application,14 and one state mandates parties
to disclose their gender.15
This Note argues that mandatory disclosures of personal
information—specifically race, sex, and gender—on a marriage license
application constitute compelled speech under the First Amendment
and should be subject to heightened scrutiny.16 Disclosing one’s race,
sex, or gender on a marriage license application is an affirmative act,
and individuals may wish to have their identity remain anonymous.
These mandatory disclosures send a message that this information
is still relevant to marriage regulation. Neither race nor gender is
based in science;17 rather they are historical and social constructs
created to uphold a system of white supremacy and heteronorma-
tivity.18 Thus, such statements are not facts which ought to be com-
pelled by the government, particularly within the sphere of marriage,
which falls within the penumbra of privacy under the Bill of Rights.19
These statutes should be struck down as unconstitutional. At a
13. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
14. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/202(a)(1) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 122(a) (2013); MINN.STAT.§ 517.08(1a)(1) (2016); OR.REV.STAT. § 106.041(2)(b) (2018);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-105(1)(a) (West 2019).
15. KY.REV.STAT.ANN. § 402.100(1)(b) (West 2017). Several states’ statutes are written
in gendered terms, referring to applicants as “bride,” “wife,” “husband,” or “groom,” when
dictating which parties must fill out specific information; therefore, although those
statutes do not explicitly dictate that parties must mark their gender in a specific box,
the gathering of this information is implicit based on how the applications are designed.
See GA.CODEANN.§ 19-3-33(a) (2005); N.H.REV.STAT.ANN. § 5-C:41(I)–(IV) (2015); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-104(a)(1) (2019).
16. While the plaintiffs in Rogers v. Virginia State Registrar raised a compelled speech
claim, the court did not reach the issue when striking down Virginia’s marriage license
statute as unconstitutional. See Rogers v. Virginia State Registrar, No. 1:19-cv-01149, slip
op. at 2, 18 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 11, 2019). Though this argument may be applied to other
government documents, such as driver’s licenses or even the Census, this Note focuses
on this argument only as it applies to marriage licenses.
17. Courts have routinely rejected a scientific approach for determining one’s race. See
United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919, 919 (D. Or. 1925); In re Singh, 257 F. 209, 212 (S.D.
Cal. 1919); see also IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
35, 37–39, 44–47, 55 (10th anniversary ed. 2006) (discussing the racial prerequisite cases).
18. See LÓPEZ, supra note 17, at xxi (“Races are not biologically differentiated groupings
but rather social constructions. Race exists alongside a multitude of social identities that
shape and are themselves shaped by the way in which race is given meaning. We live
race through class, religion, nationality, gender, sexual identity, and so on.”); Candace West
& Don H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1 GENDER & SOC’Y 125, 126 (1987) (“[T]he ‘doing’ of
gender is undertaken by women and men whose competence as members of society is
hostage to its production. Doing gender involves a complex of socially guided perceptual,
interactional, and micropolitical activities that cast particular pursuits as expressions
of masculine and feminine ‘natures.’”); see also JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 30 (1999) (examining the cultural construc-
tion of sexuality).
19. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2598–99 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769 (2013).
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minimum, states should follow Hawaii’s lead to make these disclo-
sures optional.20 Even better, similar to California, states can even-
tually explicitly forbid the government from collecting this information
on marriage license applications at all.21
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I presents a brief history
of the legal movements to achieve marriage equality, charting the
paths civil rights lawyers and activists took to get to the landmark
Supreme Court precedents Loving and Obergefell. Part II explains
the constitutional nexus between speech, privacy, and marriage.
Part III offers an overview of compelled speech doctrine, focusing on
compelled ideological messages and identity disclosures. Part IV
fuses the lines of case law discussed in Part III to argue that stat-
utes mandating the disclosure of race, sex, or gender on a marriage
license application constitute compelled speech under the First
Amendment and cannot survive strict scrutiny. Upon discussing the
theory of “Rights Dynamism,” I posit that courts should interpret
First Amendment speech claims in this realm against the historical
backdrop of anti-miscegenation laws and same-sex marriage bans,
and specifically in light of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process jurisprudence in the marriage context. Lastly,
Part V proposes legislative alternatives for states to rewrite their
marriage license statutes, either to make optional or expressly forbid
the disclosure of this data on such applications.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RACE AND SEX IN THE
CONTEXT OF MARRIAGE
A. Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Path to Loving
The first laws regulating interracial sex and marriage passed
during the colonial period in Maryland and Virginia, in 1664 and
1691, respectively.22 On the eve of the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, thirty-two states had anti-miscegenation laws in ef-
fect.23 Though some states did away with these laws during Recon-
struction, interracial marriages did not increase because social
20. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-6(a) (2013).
21. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103175(b) (West 2009).
22. PASCOE, supra note 8, at 19–20.
23. See id. at 42 (map depicting states with miscegenation laws in effect during 1865).
Several of the states whose laws today still mandate that individuals disclose their race
on a marriage license enacted miscegenation laws around this time: Delaware banned
interracial sexual behavior between 1726–1736 and then re-codified its interracial mar-
riage ban in 1807; Kentucky passed its first interracial marriage ban in 1792; and
Louisiana’s ban originally passed in 1724 and then was re-enacted in 1808. Id. at 20–21.
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pressure prevented individuals from “cross[ing] the color line.”24
Particularly for Black men, this included a genuine fear of lynching
by the Ku Klux Klan for even being rumored to have had sex with
white women.25
However, post-Reconstruction legislatures in southern states,
dominated by white men, sought to promptly re-enact these laws,
often implementing a “one-drop rule” for racial classification.26 Acting
under the guise of federalism, as marriage and sex traditionally fell
within the control of the states, twenty-six states by 1900 linked the
ideas of “illicit sex and illegitimate marriage” to strengthen their
anti-miscegenation laws and enforce stricter criminal penalties for
interracial marriages.27 Arguably the most prominent, and toughest,
example of such miscegenation statutes was Virginia’s Racial Integ-
rity Act of 1924, originally entitled “[A]n [A]ct to [P]reserve the [I]nteg-
rity of the White Race.”28 The Act instituted a one-drop rule to
preserve white purity, making it “unlawful for any white person . . .
to marry any save a white person, or a person with no other admixture
of blood than white and American Indian.”29 The Racial Integrity
Act also granted sweepingly broad powers to court clerks to discern
an individual’s race in order to prevent the issuance of marriage
licenses to interracial couples.30 By the 1930s, requiring race on a
marriage license application became so commonplace that even
states that did not have anti-miscegenation laws on the books still
required applicants to state their race.31
Working in conjunction with their anti-miscegenation laws,
some states, including Virginia, codified evasion statutes.32 These
statutes targeted interracial couples who crossed state boundaries
to marry in an effort to work around the state’s anti-miscegenation
laws, and they carried strict criminal penalties.33 Upon returning to
their home state, the couple’s marriage would be considered void and
subject to the same penalty as though the marriage was performed
24. RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND
ROMANCE 26 (2001).
25. Id. at 27.
26. Id.
27. PASCOE, supra note 8, at 62–63.
28. Id. at 142–43.
29. Id. at 142; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 n.4 (1967). Legislators included the
Pocahontas Exception in the law as an ode to the descendants of Pocahontas and John
Rolfe who identified as white. PASCOE, supra note 8, at 142, 145.
30. PASCOE, supra note 8, at 145. For more information about Walter Plecker and
The Racial Integrity Act, see supra note 8.
31. Id. at 139.
32. Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-Miscegenation Statute in
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1205–06 (1966).
33. See id. at 1205.
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within the state’s borders.34 Famously, Richard and Mildred Loving
would fall prey to Virginia’s evasion and anti-miscegenation stat-
utes when the couple returned to Virginia after traveling to nearby
Washington D.C. to marry.35
The first serious constitutional test for Virginia’s anti-miscege-
nation framework occurred in 1955 in Naim v. Naim, on an appeal
from an annulment suit for a white and Chinese couple, who trav-
eled to North Carolina for the sole purpose of marrying and then
returned to Virginia to live as a couple.36 The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals rejected the due process and equal protection
challenges to the Racial Integrity Act.37 It held that states reserved
the right to regulate marriage, and the racial classification scheme
served a reasonable purpose in enforcing the anti-miscegenation
laws.38 After two appeals to the United States Supreme Court, the
Court ultimately dismissed the case, claiming it lacked a federal
question.39 In effect, the Court’s dismissal communicated the notion
that bans on interracial marriage were constitutional so long as the
racial classification scheme was not arbitrary.40
While the Loving case, which took another swing at the Racial
Integrity Act, worked its way through the Virginia state courts, the
United States Supreme Court invalidated a Florida statute which
punished interracial cohabitation in McLaughlin v. Florida; how-
ever, the Court did not reach the ultimate issue of the constitution-
ality of interracial marriage bans.41 The judiciary’s review of these
types of statutes prompted a wave of repeals of anti-miscegenation
laws around the country.42 At the time of the first Naim decision in
1955, more than half of the states had anti-miscegenation laws in
effect.43 When Loving reached the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia in 1966, only seventeen states, predominantly in the South,
had anti-miscegenation laws in force.44
Finally, in 1967, the United States Supreme Court in Loving v.
Virginia held that anti-miscegenation laws, which rested solely upon
34. Id. at 1205–06.
35. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1967).
36. Wadlington, supra note 32, at 1208; see also Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 750–51
(Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
37. Wadlington, supra note 32, at 1208–09.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1209.
40. Id. at 1210.
41. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964); Wadlington, supra note 32, at
1189–90.
42. Wadlington, supra note 32, at 1190.
43. Id. at 1190 n.8.
44. See id. at 1190, 1190–91 n.8.
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racial distinctions, violated the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and were thus unconsti-
tutional.45
B. Same-Sex Marriage Bans, Sodomy Laws, and the Path to
Obergefell46
While same-sex unions have occurred throughout history within
various cultures around the world,47 the legal fight for marriage
equality in the United States began in 1970.48 After a Minnesota
court clerk denied Jack Baker and Mike McConnell a marriage
license in May 1970, they challenged the state law which explicitly
regulated marriage relations between “husband” and “wife” as un-
constitutional.49 State courts dismissed the suit, and the United States
Supreme Court denied Baker and McConnell’s appeal, stating that
the case lacked a “substantial federal question.”50 Courts revisited
the marriage license issue in the early 1990s, after three couples
were denied licenses in Hawaii.51 In May 1993, the Hawaii Supreme
Court held that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples
violated equal protection under the state’s constitution.52 Though
this appeared to be a promising forecast for national LGBTQ civil
rights litigation, it turned into a backlash of state legislatures across
the country enacting same-sex marriage bans.53 In addition, the
United States Congress passed the federal Defense of Marriage Act
45. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967). Despite this victory, states did not
immediately remove these statutes from the books. Alabama became the last state, via
referendum, to overturn its anti-miscegenation law in 2000. See Aaron Blake, Alabama was
a final holdout on desegregation and interracial marriage. It could happen again on gay
marriage, WASH.POST (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp
/2015/02/09/alabama-was-a-final-holdout-on-desegregation-and-interracial-marriage-it
-could-happen-again-on-gay-marriage/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/T5RN-EUYV].
46. For a general history of the legal pursuit for marriage equality, see LOVE UNITES
US: WINNING THE FREEDOM TO MARRY IN AMERICA, at v–vii (Kevin M. Cathcart & Leslie
J. Gabel-Brett eds., 2016) [hereinafter LOVE UNITES US].
47. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419, 1437, 1439, 1441, 1453 (1993).
48. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The First Marriage Cases, 1970–74, in LOVEUNITES
US, supra note 46, at 21, 22–23.
49. Id.
50. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972).
51. Evan Wolfson, The Hawai’i Marriage Case Launches the U.S. Freedom to Marry
Movement for Equality, in LOVE UNITES US, supra note 46, at 40, 40.
52. Id. at 40–41; see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration
granted by 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
53. Wolfson, supra note 51, at 41–42.
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(DOMA), which defined marriage as a union between one man and
one woman for the purposes of federal regulations.54
The movement also attempted to combat sodomy laws, which
criminalized sexual activity—often oral or anal sex—and were wea-
ponized as harassment tools and disproportionately enforced against
members of the LGBTQ community.55 Illinois became the first state
to decriminalize sodomy, and nineteen states followed suit by the
end of the 1960s.56 Civil rights lawyers seized upon the opportunity
to challenge these laws after officers arrested Michael Hardwick in
his home for having private, consensual sex in violation of Georgia’s
sodomy law.57 However, the United States Supreme Court upheld
sodomy laws in Bowers v. Hardwick, criticizing Hardwick’s argu-
ment that the constitution protected a fundamental right to sodomy
as “at best, facetious.”58 Lawyers finally succeeded seventeen years
later in Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down Texas’s sodomy law
as unconstitutional and overturned Bowers.59 The Court recognized
that the constitutional right to privacy extended to the intimate
sexual and familial decisions of same-sex couples.60
The privacy rationale in Lawrence paved the way for future
marriage equality cases.61 In November 2003, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, relying on its state constitution, reasoned
“that there was no permissible reason to exclude same-sex couples
from marriage.”62 In the following years, many states and federal
courts also relied on Lawrence in extending the right to marry to
same-sex couples.63
The United States Supreme Court struck down DOMA as un-
constitutional in 2013 in United States v. Windsor.64 Finally, in 2015,
the Court held in Obergefell v. Hodges that the Constitution recognizes
a fundamental right to same-sex marriage.65
54. See id. at 42.
55. See Kevin M. Cathcart, The Sodomy Roundtable, in LOVE UNITES US, supra note
46, at 51, 51; Suzanne B. Goldberg, “Not Tonight Dear—It’s a Felony”: Lawrence v. Texas
and the Path to Marriage Equality, in LOVE UNITES US, supra note 46, at 56, 56.
56. Cathcart, supra note 55, at 51–52.
57. Id. at 52.
58. Id. at 53; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
59. Goldberg, supra note 55, at 60, 63. For a detailed look at the story behind the
Lawrence case, see DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V.
TEXAS, at xiii (2012).
60. Goldberg, supra note 55, at 63.
61. See id. at 64.
62. Id.; see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003).
63. Goldberg, supra note 55, at 64.
64. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013).
65. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
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II. SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND MARRIAGE
The Constitution recognizes a fundamental right to privacy
within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.66 First Amendment pro-
tections, including the Free Speech Clause, are also within this
scope.67 The Supreme Court has also extended the fundamental right
to privacy to the institution of marriage.68 The mandatory declara-
tion of one’s race, sex, or gender on a marriage license application
therefore can be viewed as a nexus between the fundamental right
to marriage and free speech; both of which fall within the penumbra
of privacy under the Bill of Rights and thus should be analyzed with
the utmost care.69
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech[.]”70 It protects both an individual’s
“right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”71
Philosophers, scholars, and judges have advanced several justifica-
tions for the First Amendment.72 Famously articulated by Justice
Holmes and Justice Brandeis, the Free Speech Clause creates a
marketplace of ideas by permitting a free-flowing debate of ideas
and values in society’s search for truth.73 In addition, the Free Speech
Clause aids in promoting individual autonomy; humans necessarily
develop in their course of free-thinking through exposure to a vari-
ety of competing ideas and cultures.74 The First Amendment also
advances our system of self-government by allowing individuals to
engage with public policy and public officials.75 Lastly, society gen-
erally distrusts government to regulate speech because officials will
66. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–84, 486 (1965); see also Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973), reh’g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
67. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where
privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”).
68. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at
2604–05 (2015) (explicitly grounding the fundamental right to marry within the Four-
teenth Amendment); Windsor, 570 U.S. at 769 (recognizing marriage as a relationship
“worthy of dignity in the community”).
69. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483, 486.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
72. See Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130,
141–43 (1989).
73. See id. at 130–31; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 377 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of an “opportunity for full discus-
sion”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(discussing the need for a marketplace of ideas).
74. See Greenawalt, supra note 72, at 143–45.
75. See id. at 142–43, 145–46.
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either promote or suppress certain messages as they become en-
trenched in power.76
Necessarily invoking these justifications, the Court has ad-
dressed the doctrine of compelled speech in certain contexts, such as
political and commercial speech.77 However, there is currently a gap
in the law as to whether the government may compel individuals to
communicate private facts to the government itself.78
III. OVERVIEW OF COMPELLED SPEECH CASES
The basic factors of a First Amendment compelled speech claim
include the dictation of a specific message or belief, the attribution
of that message to the speaker, and a lack of opportunity for the
speaker to disassociate from the message.79 This section breaks
down the Court’s relevant compelled speech jurisprudence into two
categories: compelled ideological messages and compelled disclo-
sures of identity.
A. Compelled Ideological Messages: Barnette, Wooley, and FAIR
The government may not compel “people to speak things they
do not want to speak.”80 In other words, the government may not
compel individuals to affirmatively act or speak in ways that com-
municate ideological messages, and such regulations are subject to
heightened scrutiny.81
Famously, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged a school board resolution
mandating students and teachers to salute the flag and recite the
Pledge of Allegiance, and it subjected non-participating students to
76. See id. at 145–46.
77. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346–47 (1995); Zauderer
v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985); W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943). The Court’s body of compelled speech
case law also addresses issues of compelled access, as well as compelled inclusion of others
in expressive activity. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (compelled
inclusion of others in expressive organizations); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bi-
sexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 557 (1995) (compelled inclusion of others in parades);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77–78 (1980) (compelled access of
others in privately owned shopping malls); Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 241–42 (1974) (compelled access to space in newspapers).
78. Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 357 (2018).
79. See, e.g., McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334, 341–43; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
705 (1977).
80. Volokh, supra note 78, at 368.
81. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715–16; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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expulsion.82 The Supreme Court rejected the state’s interest in
advancing national unity, and rather advanced the notion of free-
dom of thought under the First Amendment in striking down the
rule83: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”84
In Wooley v. Maynard, a Jehovah’s Witness repeatedly covered
the New Hampshire state motto, “Live Free or Die,” on his vehicle’s
license plate, citing religious and moral objections.85 After facing
criminal sanctions pursuant to a state statute requiring license plates
on non-commercial vehicles to display the state motto, Maynard
brought suit challenging the statute’s constitutionality.86 Drawing
on Barnette, the Supreme Court viewed state compulsion of exhibit-
ing an ideological viewpoint—the state’s motto—on one’s personal
property for daily public display as an invasion of freedom of thought
under the First Amendment.87 The message was likely to be attrib-
uted to the individual driver, and the law prevented an opportunity
for the driver to disassociate from the message.88 Applying strict
scrutiny, the Court rejected the state’s interests in identifying pas-
senger vehicles and promoting an “appreciation of history, individu-
alism, and state pride” as not narrowly tailored because the state
can identify vehicles through the combination of letters and numbers
on the license plate.89 The Court also rejected the state’s argument
that the majority of citizens agreed with the motto as a justification
for the statute because “[t]he First Amendment protects the right of
individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and
to refuse to foster, in the way [the state] commands, an idea they
find morally objectionable.”90
In contrast, when the government merely compels access or
conduct that does not equate to a specific message or viewpoint,
82. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626, 628–29.
83. Id. at 640, 642. Barnette also suggests that regulations are subject to higher
scrutiny when there are combined First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due
process interests. Id. at 639 (“The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite
than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due
process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard.”).
84. Id. at 642.
85. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707–08.
86. Id. at 708–09.
87. Id. at 715.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 716.
90. Id. at 715.
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compelled speech claims often fail.91 In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Aca-
demic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), an association of law
schools and their faculties challenged the Solomon Amendment,
which compelled equal access to campus facilities for military re-
cruiters.92 They argued the schools’ non-discrimination policies were
at odds with the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, so the
forced inclusion and access to accommodate the military’s message
violated their First Amendment rights.93 The Court rejected this
claim because the Solomon Amendment only compelled equal access
to facilities, not the endorsement of a particular message.94 Further,
students could distinguish the government’s message as distinct
from the law schools’, and there were still opportunities to disassoci-
ate from the military’s message by allowing protests or for each
school to disseminate its own views.95
When taken together, these cases demonstrate that the govern-
ment cannot compel individuals to participate in affirmative acts
that ultimately connote a state-sponsored message that the individ-
uals would not otherwise adopt or promote.96
B. Compelled Disclosures of Identity: McIntyre, American
Constitutional Law Foundation, and Watchtower Bible
In the context of political speech, the First Amendment generally
affords protection to an individual’s identity.97 The realm of cam-
paign finance, however, is a duly noted exception to this rule.98 Regu-
lations requiring the disclosure of aspects of one’s identity, including
name and address, in order to engage in speech are subject to strict
91. See Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 60–65 (2006);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85–88 (1980) (holding a California consti-
tutional provision, which provided individuals with equal access to petition in privately
owned shopping centers, did not violate owner’s First Amendment rights). But see Mia.
Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (invalidating a “right of reply”
statute that compelled newspapers to run the replies of attacked political candidates
against their otherwise editorial judgment).
92. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 51–52.
93. Id. at 52–53.
94. Id. at 60.
95. Id. at 64–65.
96. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
97. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–43 (1995).
98. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64–74 (1976) (upholding compelled disclosures
of identity in the campaign finance realm due to government interests in deterring corrup-
tion and detecting violations of contribution limits; however, mandatory disclosures
requirements can be waived if there is a reasonable probability that such disclosures will
affect minority parties).
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scrutiny.99 Courts apply the highest form of judicial scrutiny in this
context to protect dissenters and to avoid chilling minority speech.100
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Ohio Elections
Commission fined the plaintiff one hundred dollars for distributing
anonymous handbills in violation of a state statute requiring cam-
paign literature to contain the name and address of the author.101
The text of the handbills, which urged voters to oppose a school tax,
was neither false nor misleading.102 Treating the statute as a content-
based regulation, the Supreme Court rejected the state’s interest in
providing relevant information to the electorate and preventing
fraudulent statements.103 The statute was not narrowly tailored to
serve these interests because the name and address of a private
citizen adds little value to the recipient’s evaluation of a message, nor
was this provision the state’s only way to insure against false state-
ments during the political process, as Ohio had separate provisions
in its election code to deal with this particular concern.104 In addition,
the Court noted the history of anonymous political speech, reasoning
“[t]he decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of eco-
nomic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or
merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.”105
Building on the right to anonymity, the plaintiffs in Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. challenged a Colo-
rado statute requiring initiative-petitioners to wear a name badge
and mandating advocates to report the names and addresses of paid
petitioner-circulators.106 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court rejected
the state’s interest in the public’s ability to identify, and the state’s
ability to apprehend, people engaged in misconduct.107 Compelling
individuals to reveal their identity while delivering a political
message, when one’s interest in anonymity may be at its peak,
effectively discourages political speech.108
Lastly, in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc.
v. Village of Stratton, a congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, whose
teachings require followers to proselytize and distribute religious
99. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165
(2002); Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199 (1999); McIntyre, 514
U.S. at 347.
100. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. at 199–200.
101. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337–38, 388 n.3.
102. Id. at 337.
103. Id. at 348–53.
104. Id. at 347–49, 353.
105. Id. at 341–42.
106. Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197–99 (1999).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 198–200.
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literature door-to-door, challenged a village ordinance instructing
canvassers and petitioners to obtain a permit from the mayor’s office
before conducting door-to-door advocacy.109 Up front, the Supreme
Court recognized the need to analyze this case against the historic
backdrop in which this particular group has routinely faced First
Amendment challenges from a religious and free speech stand-
point.110 The Court rejected the state’s interest in preventing fraud
and crime, as well as protecting residents’ privacy.111 Although
towns may enact ordinances to protect individuals from unwanted
solicitation, the Court struck down this particular ordinance as
overbroad because it infringed on the rights of religious groups who
engaged in proselytization as well as the rights of individuals en-
gaged in political discourse, including spontaneous speech.112
Thus, while the right to anonymity is not absolute, regulations
compelling the disclosure of personal identity as a prerequisite for
engaging in basic political speech are subject to strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment.113
IV. STATUTORY MANDATES REQUIRING THE DISCLOSURE OF
ONE’S RACE, SEX, OR GENDER ON A MARRIAGE LICENSE
VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Upon fusing the two lines of compelled speech doctrine dis-
cussed in Part III, statutes that mandate individuals to disclose
their race, sex, or gender on a marriage license application cannot
survive strict scrutiny. This section proceeds in four parts. First, it
applies the compelled speech factors derived from the case law to
disclosures of race, sex, and gender identity on marriage licenses.
Next, it argues for extending anonymity to these aspects of identity,
distinguishing marriage licenses from identity documents and the
census, while reconciling self-identification and anti-discrimination
efforts. Third, it introduces the theory of “Rights Dynamism” to
advocate interpreting these statutory mandates in light of Four-
teenth Amendment marriage equality jurisprudence. Finally, it
demonstrates that these compelled disclosures cannot withstand
constitutional muster.
109. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. Of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153–55,
160 (2002).
110. Id. at 160–64.
111. Id. at 164–65.
112. Id. at 165–68.
113. See id. at 150–51; Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. at 199; McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 334–35 (1995). But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
64–74 (1976).
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A. Analyzing Compelled Speech Factors in Marriage Licensing
Schemes
The government may not compel people to “speak things they
do not want to speak,” and such compelled ideological affirmations
are subject to heightened scrutiny.114 Here, filling out a box with one
of the state’s pre-selected racial categories,115 or often binary gender
or sex designations, is an affirmative act within the plain meaning
of the phrase. The compulsion of a message in this context is argu-
ably in the gray area between Barnette and FAIR. Compelling a
message through self-identification on a marriage license does not
automatically conjure up the image of a compulsory flag salute, but
it certainly is more directly attributable to the individual when
compared to the military’s anti-LGBTQ message vis-à-vis the law
schools in FAIR.116
The statutes at issue here require individuals to convey a funda-
mental aspect of their identity. Some may contend that is a fairly
neutral message, perhaps no state-sponsored message is present at
all. But when one confronts the legislative history and ideology
behind these laws, which have roots in policing certain relationships
to maintain systems of white supremacy and heteronormativity, it
contextualizes these seemingly minor compulsions, and their harmful
message becomes clear.117 States deliberately crafted mandatory dis-
closures of race, sex, and gender data in marriage licensing schemes
to suppress certain groups, predominately people of color and
LGBTQ individuals.118 States did not intend these classifications to
celebrate diversity across racial lines or the gender spectrum.119
114. Volokh, supra note 78, at 368; see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715–16 (1977);
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
115. In 1977, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Directive No. 15,
charging federal agencies to use five racial and ethnic categories for statistical data and
civil rights enforcement; OMB revised the guidelines in 1997 to add two new categories
and allow for self-selection of multiple categories. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782, REVISIONS TO THE STANDARDS FOR THE
CLASSIFICATION OF FEDERAL DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY (1997). OMB Directive No.
15 sets the federal floor for minimum racial categories, and while states have leeway to
adopt more categories, many follow the guidance of this Directive for state-level govern-
ment data. See id. While the categories have garnered criticism, OMB retained its original
charge, explaining “[t]he racial and ethnic categories set forth in the standards should not
be interpreted as being primarily biological or genetic in reference. Race and ethnicity
may be thought of in terms of social and cultural characteristics as well as ancestry.” Id.
116. See Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 60–65 (2006);
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627–29.
117. See supra Part I.
118. See supra Part I.
119. See supra Part I.
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Rather, by forcing individuals to label themselves in this particular
context, it sent a message of inferiority and oppression based on the
color of one’s skin or sexuality.120 By requiring individuals to con-
tinue to label themselves in this manner, the state continues to send
a message that this information is somehow still relevant to mar-
riage. When the applicant, the speaker, is forced to label oneself in
this context, it sends a message of endorsement and complicity in
perpetuating this scheme.
While such compulsions may not be as drastic as the govern-
ment compelling students to salute the flag or to publicly display
the state motto on personal property,121 the effect is nonetheless the
same. These statutory mandates require individuals to effectively
adopt a state’s unjustified construction of race, sex, and gender
categories and hierarchies122—to place themselves in a pre-ordained
box against their otherwise rational and moral judgment.
Central to a compelled speech claim is the speaker’s lack of
opportunity to disassociate from the message the government is
forcing upon them.123 In order to obtain a marriage license, individu-
als must truthfully and accurately fill out each required box with
the relevant information.124 Since this is a government document,
individuals face the threat of perjury prosecution if they fail to
complete the application truthfully.125 On the other hand, the license
will not issue if one fails to provide the state with all of the required
data, thereby inhibiting the exercise of the right to marry.126
These statutory mandates thus create a catch-22 for individuals
intending to marry: either adopt the state’s message by filling out
the boxes despite the known problematic legacy of these laws—and
potentially perjure oneself by, out of necessity, selecting an category
from the options provided even if one does not personally identify
with it—or forgo the right to marry.
120. See PASCOE, supra note 8, at 9.
121. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626.
122. Implicit hierarchies form based on the presentation order of categories. Scholars
suggest that the government’s refusal to alphabetize racial categories on the Census,
instead listing “white” first, implicitly creates a hierarchy of race. See Manav Bhatnagar,
Note, Identifying the Identified: The Census, Race, and the Myth of Self-Classification, 13
TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 85, 104 (2007) (citing DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIAL SUBJECTS:
WRITING ON RACE IN AMERICA 53 (1997)). This argument can also extend to states only
providing binary gender categories on government forms. This effectively erases non-
binary or gender non-conforming individuals from the narrative.
123. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 705–06; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
124. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-434 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-267 (2005)
(amended 2020).
125. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1223 (1995); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:224(A)(7) (2016);
2015 La. Sess. Law Serv. 436 (West).
126. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.100 (West 2017).
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B. Extending the Right to Anonymity to Racial, Sexual, and
Gender Identity
Individuals may reasonably wish for their racial or gender iden-
tity to remain anonymous. In the political speech context, anonym-
ity is generally protected and regulations requiring the disclosure of
aspects of one’s identity in order to engage in speech are subject to
strict scrutiny.127 Because anonymity applies to personal details such
as one’s name or address in the context of political speech,128 this prin-
ciple should extend to aspects of racial, sexual, and gender identity.
While some jurisdictions require individuals to apply for a
marriage license in person, many states are moving toward online
applications.129 In that respect, court clerks cannot as easily discern
these aspects of one’s identity. Arguably, even for individuals who
live in states requiring in-person applications, one’s race or gender,
as a matter of pure fact, is not always objectively verifiable to the
clerks who approve these applications.130 Rather, the observable
traits include one’s skin color or how one performs their racial or
gender identity through their clothing or language.131 Further, the
mandated inclusion of this information has no bearing on the court
clerk’s decision-making process for an individual’s eligibility for a
127. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 164–65
(2002); Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 198–99 (1999); McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995). But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
64–74 (1976).
128. See Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 150; Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. at
199; McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341–43.
129. See Applications for a Vital Record, VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.vdh.vir
ginia.gov/vital-records/applications-for-a-vital-record [http://perma.cc/T5VK-8GJH]. This
may also vary by judicial districts in each state. See Weiner, supra note 4. In Virginia,
for example, procedures and forms vary by county. Id.
130. See LÓPEZ, supra note 17, at 151 (“[P]ersons who, because their physical appear-
ance allows them to, hold themselves out as members of a group to which by social custom
they would not be assigned on the basis of their ancestry.”).
131. Social psychologists notably argue that the formation of a racial identity is learned
through parental and environmental socialization. See TANYA KATERÍ HERNÁNDEZ,
MULTIRACIALS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: MIXED RACE STORIES OF DISCRIMINATION 96 (2018).
“[T]he formation of [B]lack identity is contested and multidimensional and more
accurately viewed as a ‘metamorphic process’ . . . .” Id. at 96. Criticisms of an individual’s
racial performance often arise in college in the form of statements such as “acting white”
or not being “Black enough” based on the shade of one’s skin. Id. Individuals who identify
as mixed race, Latinx, and Asian go through a similar process. See id. at 97. Analogous to
this is the notion of gender performance. As Jeffrey Kosbie notes, “individual gender
performances are constantly evaluated against norms defining how men and women
should behave. Most of us constantly use our behavior, mannerisms, appearance, speech,
and activities to prove that we are male or female.” Jeffrey Kosbie, (No) State Interests in
Regulating Gender: How Suppression of Gender Nonconformity Violates Freedom of Speech,
19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 187, 201 (2013). For a discussion of the feminist theory
of gender performativity, see BUTLER, supra note 18, at 24–25, 33.
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marriage license because one cannot be denied on the basis of race,
sex, or gender under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.132
1. Distinguishing Marriage Licenses from General Identity
Documents
A statement of one’s race, sex, or gender is wholly irrelevant to
the purpose of a marriage license. The purpose of these documents is
to confirm the parties’ legal eligibility to marry and to create a record
of marriages performed in the state.133 Identity documents, on the
other hand, are commonly and routinely used by local, state, and fed-
eral officials to identify individuals.134 Examples of identity docu-
ments include birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and passports.135
Thus, marriage licenses are not considered identity documents.
Given this distinction, mandating the disclosure of race, sex, or
gender data is even more suspect if states do not require the revela-
tion of this information until documents like marriage licenses.
While the decentralized birth registration system in the United
States can vary at the local level, many states base their vital birth
statistical data on guidance from the U.S. Standard Certificate of
Live Birth.136 This document notably does not include a statement
of the infant’s race, but does include the race of the parents.137 It
also includes a space to indicate the infant’s sex at birth, but not its
gender.138 In the same vein, most states do not list an individual’s
race on their driver’s license, but all include sex or gender mark-
ers.139 Similarly, the United States Passport Application does not
132. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
133. See, e.g., N.H.REV.STAT.ANN. § 457:22 (2006). Common criteria for eligibility for
marriage include one’s age for consent purposes and current marital status. See, e.g., LA.
STAT. ANN. § 224(A)(2), (4) (2016).
134. Adam Herpolsheimer, Note, A Third Option: Identity Documents, Gender Non-
Conformity, and the Law, 39 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 46, 47 n.4 (2017).
135. Id.
136. See Birth Certificates, AM. BAR ASS’N (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.americanbar
.org/groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legal-docs/birth-certificates [http://
perma.cc/L9ZS-AD8U].
137. U.S. Standard Certificate of Live Birth, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/birth
11-03final-ACC.pdf [http://perma.cc/U776-44W9].
138. Id. But compare CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 7-52(a) (2001) (requiring the collection of the
infant’s sex, but not race, on birth certificate), with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.051(1)(b)
(West 2005) (amended 2020) (requiring a statement of both the infant’s sex and race on
a birth certificate).
139. Cassius Adair, Licensing Citizenship: Anti-Blackness, Identification Documents, and
Transgender Studies, 71 AM. Q. 569, 587–88 (2019) (explaining how race markers “quietly
disappeared from most US driver’s licenses at some point in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury[,]” but sex markers are universally mandated and bolstered by the 2005 Real ID Act).
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require applicants to disclose their race or gender, but it does re-
quire applicants to identify themselves as one of the binary sexes.140
Setting aside sex and gender designations for a moment,141 it is
worth clearly noting that the most common identity documents do
not include spaces for racial identity labels, yet by no coincidence,
a handful of states still mandate the disclosure of racial information
on marriage license applications.142 Thus, the current statutes that
require the disclosure of this identifying information in the mar-
riage context are undoubtedly linked to anti-miscegenation laws
that sought to police interracial sex and marriage years ago143: if this
information is truly so important for statistical purposes, it would
be collected before the stage in life when one seeks to wed.
2. Distinguishing Legal Challenges to Census Categories in
Morales v. Daley
Litigants have unsuccessfully attempted to bring compelled
speech claims regarding the collection of sex and racial identity data
on the census.144 In Morales v. Daley, plaintiffs advanced both First
Amendment compelled speech and Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection claims in relation to the 2000 census.145 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas upheld the
race and ethnic categories used in this context because the census
is mandated by the Constitution to provide an enumeration of the
citizenry.146 Historically, however, it provides more than a mere
headcount.147 The racial data148 collected from the census is used in
drafting and enforcing regulations, such as “assess[ing] racial dis-
parities in health and environmental risks” in addition to informing
140. See U.S. Passport Application, https://eforms.state.gov/Forms/ds11.pdf [http://
perma.cc/C74M-5WW2].
141. Sex designations seem to be a common thread on these identity documents. How-
ever, the issue of whether race, sex, or gender disclosures on common identity documents
meet the strict scrutiny standard is beyond the scope of this Note.
142. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 1165(3) (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-25 (2012);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 122(a) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:41(III) (2015); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 9:224(A)(2) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.100(1)(b) (West 2017).
143. See supra Section I.A and accompanying notes.
144. See Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 809, 820 (S.D. Tex. 2000); see also
Bhatnagar, supra note 122, at 94 (noting that Morales is the only federal lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the census’ race categories and racial data collection).
145. See Morales, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
146. Id. at 814–15.
147. Id. at 809.
148. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 115.
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reapportionment, legislative redistricting, and voting rights.149 In
addressing the compelled speech issue, the Court also noted that
individuals are not disseminating a public message that they dis-
agree with by filling out the census.150 In light of this precedent,
courts may be skeptical of compelled speech claims relating to the
disclosure of similar data on marriage license applications.
However, the rationale in Morales is readily distinguishable as
applied to compelled speech claims regarding the mandatory label-
ing of one’s race, sex, or gender on a marriage license.151 First, the
census and marriage licenses serve distinct purposes. The Founders
intentionally created the census as a mechanism for enumeration
and apportionment,152 whereas states did not create marriage li-
censes for this purpose. As previously mentioned, the purpose of
marriage licenses is to confirm one’s legal eligibility to marry and to
create a record of marriages within the state.153 Second, the data
collected from the census is used to inform government program-
ming and spending, whereas the data collected from marriage
license applications does not serve this function.154 As the Common-
wealth of Virginia conceded in Rogers, the state had no legitimate
interest in the data collected from marriage licenses, and the court
noted that the variability of the racial categories employed by the
state likely produced high rates of error, rendering any data col-
lected as practically useless.155 Third, the census data collection does
not infringe on other fundamental rights and is required by the
Constitution.156 In comparison, the collection of race, sex, and gender
data in the marriage license context interferes with the fundamen-
tal right to marry.157 State officials cannot deny issuing a marriage
license on the basis of one’s race, sex, or gender under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.158
149. Morales, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 813.
150. Id. at 816.
151. See id. at 815–16.
152. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
153. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
154. Why We Conduct the Decennial Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/why.html [http://perma
.cc/74ZM-7YGW].
155. Rogers v. Virginia State Registrar, No. 1:19-cv-01149, slip op. at 17–18 (E.D. Va.
filed Oct. 11, 2019); see also infra Section IV.D (arguing that race, sex, and gender
mandates on marriage licenses fail strict scrutiny).
156. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
157. See Rogers, slip op. at 18 (“[R]equiring Plaintiffs to disclose their race in order to
receive marriage licenses burdens their fundamental right to marry.”).
158. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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3. Reconciling Anti-Discrimination Efforts, the Right to
Self-Identify, and the Right to Anonymity
Some may argue that mandatory disclosures of personal
information—specifically race, sex, and gender—on a marriage license
and other government-related documents can actually advance anti-
discrimination efforts.159 Generally, color-blind policies do more
harm than good, so having this data can aid in the creation and
enforcement of equitable policies to effectively serve communities.160
While the collection of this data on identification documents and
government surveys is critical to addressing systemic racism and
sexism in a variety of fields, it is highly suspect to collect this infor-
mation in the marriage license context due to the historic relation-
ship between anti-miscegenation laws and policing of LGBTQ
sexual and marital relationships. State governments have no practi-
cal use for such disclosures on this particular document,161 and if so
desired for statistical purposes, they can get this information from
proper identity documents or other sources.162
Arguably, at the core of many equality movements, groups have
fought tirelessly for the right to publicly self-identify.163 This is ex-
hibited through sit-ins during the Civil Rights Movement, the process
of gay men and lesbians coming out in public spaces during the Gay
Liberation Movement, and most recently, transgender and nonbinary
individuals changing their gender markers on identity documents
to project an accurate representation of themselves to the public.164
159. See Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 813 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
160. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 199, 224–27 (2010) (arguing that the War on Drugs and
mandatory minimum sentencing laws have led to the mass incarceration of black men);
IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 22–23 (2005) (examining how New Deal
and Fair Deal era social policies, including Social Security and the G.I. Bill, created social
and economic opportunities that effectively solidified a white middle class, widening the
gap between white and Black Americans); Jennifer S. Carrera & Catherine Coleman
Flowers, Sanitation Inequity and the Cumulative Effects of Racism in Colorblind Public
Health Policies, 77 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO. 941, 949–61 (2018) (discussing the use of land
control, housing availability, and public health code enforcement to devalue Black bodies
and criminalize poverty); Shannon M. Monnat, Toward a Critical Understanding of
Gendered Color-Blind Racism Within the U.S. Welfare Institution, 40 J. BLACK STUD.
637, 647–49 (2010) (explaining how the stereotypical characterization of Black women
as deviant, undeserving, “welfare queens” leads to greater likelihood that they will be
sanctioned within the United States welfare system).
161. See infra Section IV.D.
162. See supra Section IV.B.1; infra Section IV.D.
163. See TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 147 (2018).
164. See id. at 167; WILLIAM N.ESKRIDGE,JR., GAYLAW:CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID
OF THE CLOSET 93–95, 123–25 (1999); Timothy Zick, The Dynamic Relationship Between
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Equally important to these equality movements, however, was the
right to speak and associate anonymously.165 From an autonomy
perspective, there is no doubt that the right to self-identify is critical
for individuals and groups; however, the argument advanced here
is predominately about being compelled to self-identify as it may
infringe on another fundamental right or one’s privacy.166
C. Rights Dynamism and the Influence of the Fourteenth
Amendment Jurisprudence on First Amendment Interpretation
Just as in Watchtower Bible, where the Court analyzed the free
speech claim in light of the deep history of religious discrimination
against that particular group,167 the statutes that require disclosure
of one’s race, sex, or gender should be analyzed with the historic
backdrop of anti-miscegenation laws and same-sex marriage bans
in mind.168 The Due Process and Equal Protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment can help inform and influence First Amend-
ment speech protections in this realm, based on the notion described
by some constitutional scholars as “Rights Dynamism.”169 Rights
Dynamism refers to “the dynamic process in which constitutional
rights intersect and interact with one another.”170 As Professor
Timothy Zick notes, “constitutional rights do not exist in strict
isolation from one another. To the contrary, they are connected by
thick historical, precedential, and doctrinal tissues.”171 Related to this
is Professor Michael Coenen’s concept of “combination analysis.”172
Freedom of Speech and Equality, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 12, 19–22 (2016);
Andy Newman, Male, Female, or “X”: The Push for a Third Choice on Official Forms,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/nyregion/gender-neu
tral-birth-certificate.html [http://perma.cc/3NT9-TZNY].
165. See ZICK, supra note 163, at 25; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 515 U.S.
334, 357 (1995); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
166. It is worth noting that certain populations have genuine fears of retaliation by
government officials based on compelled self-identification. While beyond the scope of the
Note, a recent newsworthy example was the legal battle over adding a citizenship ques-
tion to the 2020 census, with fears of the Trump Administration particularly targeting un-
documented individuals living in the United States. See Michael Wines, 2020 Census
Won’t Have Citizenship Question as Trump Administration Drops Effort, N.Y. TIMES
(July 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/trump-census-citizenship-ques
tion.html [http://perma.cc/NZ9E-T63L].
167. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 161
(2002).
168. See supra Part I.
169. See Timothy Zick, Rights Dynamism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 791, 793–94 (2017);
Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Informational Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 55 (2004).
170. Zick, supra note 169, at 793.
171. Id. at 797.
172. See Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U.PA.L.REV. 1067,
1077 (2016).
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By engaging in holistic constitutional interpretation and strategi-
cally crafting claims containing two or more clauses, litigators and
judges can identify big picture constitutional principles, which can in
turn influence judicial outcomes “even when the principles themselves
cannot be derived from a lone provision of the constitutional text.”173
Frequently, activists and litigants bring Due Process and Equal
Protection claims together, and while these provisions are distinct,
judges interpret their meanings in relation to and intersecting with
one another.174 This can be evidenced in defining and expanding the
fundamental right to marriage in Loving, and perhaps most explic-
itly in Obergefell, where the Court noted the dynamic and evolution-
ary relationship between the two clauses:
In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the
essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way,
even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and def-
inition of the right. This interrelation of the two principles fur-
thers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.175
Just as the Due Process and Equal Protections Clauses share an
abstract principle of fundamental fairness, the First Amendment
Free Speech Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause are historically and substantively connected to protect minori-
ties and dissenters from discrimination by state actors in the political
majority.176 Similarly, legal advocates in both the race and LGBTQ
equality movements have invoked First Amendment rights both in
combination with and to facilitate Equal Protection claims.177 Early
cases helped establish a right to expressive equality based on free
speech and equal protection principles.178 This granted Black folks,
and later LGBTQ individuals, basic freedoms to speak, associate, and
publish materials.179 Building on these rights and principles, it per-
mitted these groups to express their identities in numerous and cre-
ative ways; eventually in Obergefell, the Supreme Court noted that the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
protect “a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow per-
sons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”180
173. Id. at 1098.
174. Zick, supra note 169, at 812–14.
175. Id. at 812–16 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015)).
176. Id. at 812, 818.
177. Id. at 818–19.
178. Id. at 827.
179. See id. at 827–28; ZICK, supra note 163, at 141; ESKRIDGE, supra note 164, at
93–96, 111–16.
180. Zick, supra note 169, at 828 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (emphasis
added)).
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Even within its compelled speech jurisprudence, the Court expressly
noted in Barnette that the underlying principles of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments trigger more heightened scrutiny when read
together, rather than in isolation, to advance the notion of freedom of
thought.181 These examples illustrate the bidirectional nature of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments and how the principles of free
speech, due process, and equal protection can evolve with and build
upon each other.
Thus, as Professor Zick explains, “changing notions of constitu-
tional equality can influence judicial interpretations of expressive
rights” leading courts to expand or “interpret free speech claims in
light of changes in equal protection doctrine.”182 The evolution of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence during the fight for marriage equal-
ity from Loving to Obergefell, striking down anti-miscegenation laws
and same-sex marriage bans on equal protection and due process
grounds,183 should influence the examination of First Amendment
compelled speech claims as they pertain to marriage licenses. As most
recently noted in Rogers v. Virginia State Registrar, Virginia’s statu-
tory mandate requiring the disclosure of one’s race on a marriage
license application burdened citizens’ fundamental right to marry
under the Fourteenth Amendment and was so clearly tied to the law
at the heart of Loving fifty-two years before.184 The same logic can
easily be extended in light of recognizing the fundamental right to
marry for same-sex couples, as mandatory disclosures of sex and
gender on marriage licenses can be linked to the legal framework that
once policed and prevented intimate relationships among LGBTQ
persons.185 By striking down statutes compelling the disclosure of
race, sex, or gender in this realm, courts will not only expand First
Amendment freedoms pertaining to self-identification—including the
choice not to self-identify—and personal expression, but also simul-
taneously protect the exercise of the fundamental right to marry.
D. Race, Sex, and Gender Mandates on Marriage Licenses Fail
Strict Scrutiny
Content-based speech regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.186
To survive strict scrutiny, the government must advance a compelling
181. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
182. Zick, supra note 169, at 807.
183. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
184. Rogers v. Virginia State Registrar, No. 1:19-cv-01149, slip op. at 17–18 (E.D. Va.
filed Oct. 11, 2019).
185. See supra Section I.B and accompanying notes.
186. Reed v. Town of Gilbert 576 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2015).
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interest in regulating speech, and the regulation must be narrowly
tailored to the serve that interest.187 A state’s only plausible interests
in mandating the disclosure of specific race, sex, or gender informa-
tion on a marriage license is data collection or identification.
As evidenced in the cases discussed in Part III, state interests in
preventing fraud or crime,188 providing the public with relevant in-
formation,189 and protecting others privacy,190 or even promoting
broader ideological notions of unity191 or individualism192 did not
pass the constitutional muster of strict scrutiny. When viewed in
isolation, those state interests seem more serious and compelling
than mere data collection. Yet, the Court’s ultimate rejection of
those interests is quite telling of the high bar the statutes at hand
would have to pass.193
When confronted with this issue in Rogers, the Commonwealth
of Virginia conceded it had no state interest in the racial data col-
lected from marriage licenses.194 Though the State Registrar’s Office
generates statistical tables based on the information collected on
marriage licenses,195 when the plaintiffs filed suit in September
2019, the Commonwealth had not updated its racial data tables
since 2013.196 In addition, the Virginia Department of Health had
not conducted a substantive study based on the racial data collected,
nor had any third parties requested the data.197 The court also noted
that the Registrar’s data collection efforts likely produced high rates
of error given the variability of racial categories offered by the
Commonwealth on its marriage license applications; therefore, any
data collected in this context is practically useless.198 These concerns
187. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
188. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
164–65 (2002); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 335.
189. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 335.
190. See Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 164–65.
191. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
192. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).
193. See Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 168–69; McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 335; Barnette,
319 U.S. at 641; Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17.
194. Rogers v. Virginia State Registrar, No. 1:19-cv-01149, slip op. at 17 (E.D. Va. filed
Oct. 11, 2019).
195. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-268.1 (2020).
196. See Rogers Compl., supra note 6, at 25. The Virginia Department of Health has
since updated its statistics through 2018. See Statistical Reports and Tables, VA. DEP’T
OF HEALTH, https://www.vdh.virginia.gov/HealthStats/stats.htm [http://perma.cc/FX27
-A5ZH]. However, the Department only breaks down the racial data into “white,” “black,”
“other,” and “unknown.” See Rogers Compl., supra note 6, at 25.
197. See Rogers Compl., supra note 6, at 25.
198. Rogers, slip op. at 18.
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hold true for other states’ collection efforts as well.199 Thus, the lack
of regular and meaningful use of the data collected from marriage li-
censes effectively undermines the compelling nature of this interest.200
It is also important not to lose sight that, even if states once had
a compelling interest in the collecting race, sex, and gender informa-
tion in this context, their purpose in doing so was ultimately to
prevent interracial and same-sex marriages.201 By gathering this
information, states could effectively enforce anti-miscegenation laws
and same-sex marriage bans.202 That interest can no longer survive
in light of Loving and Obergefell.203
While identification may be a compelling interest in certain
contexts, these laws are not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
As demonstrated in Section IV.B.1, marriage licenses are not iden-
tity documents.204 Rather, the government can effectively serve this
interest by collecting identification information from proper sources,
such as birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and passports.205 Fur-
ther, by only providing binary gender or sex markers on these docu-
ments, these laws are underinclusive because they do not gather
identifying information about non-binary individuals, thereby erasing
or invalidating their existence.
Similarly, even if one were to simply assume the government
had a compelling interest in data collection, these statutes are not
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. As evidenced above, if there
is no practical use for such data from marriage licenses, there is no
reason to require its divulgence. Optional, rather than mandatory,
disclosure would provide a less intrusive alternative. Furthermore,
the United States Census Bureau accumulates race and sex data
199. For example, Delaware and Connecticut have not updated their marriage statistics
since 2015, and Delaware only breaks down its data by “black” and “white.” See Delaware
Vital Statistics Annual Report Marriage and Divorce, 2015, DEL. HEALTH &SOC.SERVS.,
https://dhss.delaware.gov/dhss/dph/hp/files/m_d15.pdf [http://perma.cc/G9RU-EVUH];
Connecticut Registration Report: Births, Deaths, and Marriages Calendar Year 2015,
CONN. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Departments-and-Agencies
/DPH/Vital-Statistics/Registration-Reports/Reports/RR2015.pdf?la=en [http://perma.cc/W8
QS-6DUZ]. Kentucky, on the other hand, has no data available online.
200. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547
(1993) (“It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that a ‘law cannot be
regarded as protecting an interest “of the highest order” . . . when it leaves appreciable
damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.’”) (citations omitted).
201. See supra Part I.
202. See supra Part I
203. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
204. See supra Section IV.B.1.
205. See Herpolsheimer, supra note 134, at 47 n.4.
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when conducting the American Community Survey, among other sur-
veys like the census.206 The Census Bureau then publishes this data
for local, state, and federal use to inform policies and programs.207
The identity documents discussed above also serve as data sources.208
Because the state has access to this information from government
surveys and other documents, the duplicative nature of mandatory
disclosures in the marriage license context is unnecessary.
Thus, lacking a compelling governmental interest in both data
collection and identification, compounded by the narrow tailoring
concerns, it is clear that statutes that mandate the disclosure of
race, sex, or gender on a marriage license do not pass the constitu-
tional muster of strict scrutiny.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES
As demonstrated above, the current statutes in force mandating
the disclosure of race,209 sex,210 or gender211 on marriage license
applications constitute compelled speech under the First Amend-
ment and are thereby unconstitutional. If these statutes do not find
their way into federal courts first, state legislatures can preemp-
tively revise their marriage license statutes in light of these consti-
tutional and historical concerns. California, North Carolina, and
Hawaii present a spectrum of legislative alternatives.212
California’s marriage license statute expressly forbids the collec-
tion of racial data on a marriage license, nor does it mention the
collection of sex or gender data on its face.213 As written, this statute
seemingly does away with the First Amendment concerns because
206. See American Community Survey: Questions on the Form and Why We Ask, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/acs/www/about/why-we-ask-each-question/in
dex.php [http://perma.cc/U5MU-UUQ9].
207. See American Community Survey: Why We Ask Questions About Marital Status
/Marital History, U.S.CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/acs/www/about/why-we
-ask-each-question/marital [http://perma.cc/F58S-UJ56].
208. See supra Section IV.B.1.
209. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 1165(3) (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-25 (2012);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 122(a) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:41(III) (2015); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 9:224(A)(2) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.100(1)(b) (West 2017).
210. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/202(a)(1) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 122(a) (2013); MINN.STAT.§ 517.08(1a)(1) (2016); OR.REV.STAT. § 106.041(2)(b) (2018);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-105(1)(a) (West 2019).
211. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.100(1)(b) (West 2017).
212. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103175(b) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51
-16 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-6(a) (2013).
213. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103175(b) (West 2009) (“The marriage license
shall not contain any reference to the race or color of parties married.”).
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there is no compulsion of these aspects of identity.214 By preventing
the collection of this information, this statutory construction attempts
to make amends with the historic use of marriage licensing schemes
to police and prohibit marriages between certain populations.215
Some states, like North Carolina, allow for the optional disclo-
sure of this information.216 However, the statute lists twenty-four
race markers for applicants to choose from, including “other.”217
While optional disclosure is certainly better than mandatory, this
alternative does not alleviate the concerns raised by state-sponsored
construction of race and the messages associated. The autonomy
and negative theories of the First Amendment are implicated here
because the state is still choosing, thereby limiting, the possible
identities one can express.
Hawaii, on the other hand, currently does not statutorily man-
date the disclosure of race, sex, or gender on its marriage license.218
Rather, if the state opts to collect new information not previously
prescribed for health or statistical purposes, the statute requires
any new criterion added to the license must be optional for appli-
cants.219 This option presents the best of both worlds solution; it
allows groups who have fought tremendously for the right to self-
identify to have the right to do so, while simultaneously not compel-
ling individuals, now or ever, to disclose this information.
If a state collects this information at all, it should be optional to
designate. This is the simplest way out of the compelled speech issue,
as the state would no longer be compelling a message. However, lurk-
ing in the backdrop of the First Amendment argument advanced
throughout this Note is that race, sex, and gender designations are
wholly irrelevant, therefore unnecessary, to granting a marriage li-
cense because clerks cannot deny licenses on these grounds under
the Fourteenth Amendment.220 Reading the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in tandem to advance broader constitutional notions
of equality221 would suggest the ultimate solution is to outrightly
214. See id.
215. See supra Part I.
216. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-16 (2020).
217. Id.
218. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-6(a) (2013).
219. See id. (“Any other information consistent with the standard marriage certificate,
as recommended by the Public Health Service, National Center for Health Statistics,
may be requested for statistical or other purposes . . . provided that the information shall
be provided at the option of the applicant and no applicant shall be denied a license for
failure to provide the information.”).
220. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
221. See supra Section IV.C.
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prohibit the collection of race, sex, and gender information on mar-
riage licenses.
CONCLUSION
Thanks to dedicated lawyers and activists, as well as coura-
geous plaintiffs, there have been significant legal and social achieve-
ments in the marriage equality movements.222 Landmark victories
in Loving and Obergefell have affirmed and validated the civil rights
of interracial and same-sex couples, despite the historic and system-
atic efforts to control their bodies and police their relationships.223
Notwithstanding these achievements, however, there are still barri-
ers to fully exercising the fundamental right to marriage. Fifty-four
years after Loving, and six years after Obergefell, six states and
territories still statutorily require individuals to disclose their race on
a marriage license application,224 and six states mandate the disclo-
sure of sex or gender.225 After Rogers v. Virginia State Registrar,
which struck down Virginia’s racial mandate as unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment,226 some state legislatures have
begun to revisit and revise their marriage license statutes after the
case drew attention to the clear connection to Jim Crow laws.227
As this Note has demonstrated, statutes requiring individuals
to disclose their race, sex, or gender on a marriage license applica-
tion constitute compelled speech under the First Amendment and
these laws cannot survive heightened scrutiny.228 By mandating the
disclosure of this information, individuals must affirmatively act to
turn over fundamental aspects of their identity that they may other-
wise wish to keep anonymous and that are wholly unrelated to the
purpose of a marriage license. Unlike scientific or factual information,
222. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594–95; Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
223. See supra Part I.
224. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit 24, § 1165(3) (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-25 (2012);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 122(a) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:41(III) (2015); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 9:224(A)(2) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.100(1)(b) (West 2017). Please
note that this total reflects the count at the time of writing in August 2020.
225. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/202(a)(1) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 122(a) (2013); MINN.STAT.§ 517.08(1a)(1) (2016); OR.REV.STAT. § 106.041(2)(b) (2018);
COLO.REV.STAT. § 14-2-105(1)(a) (West 2019); KY.REV.STAT.ANN. § 402.100(1)(b) (West
2017).
226. Rogers v. Virginia State Registrar, No. 1:19-cv-01149, slip op. at 18 (E.D. Va. filed
Oct. 11, 2019).
227. See H.B. 1644, 166th Gen. Court, 2020 Sess. (N.H. 2020); S.B. 194, 150th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2019); see also ALA.CODE § 30-1-21(a), (b), (g) (2019) (removing
the racial mandate in late August 2019).
228. See supra Part IV.
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racial and gender identities are social and historical constructions
that should not be compelled by the government in the context of
marriage documents. Noting the historical ties to anti-miscegenation
laws and same-sex marriage bans, courts should engage in holistic
constitutional interpretation to analyze these statutes with an even
more critical eye to advance not only First Amendment speech rights,
but also equal protection and due process principles. By striking down
and revising these statutes, courts and legislatures can work to de-
crease barriers for individuals to exercise their fundamental rights.
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